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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-
2(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Bybee's motion to 
set aside the April 17th Order, purporting to extend the judgment against Bybee for an 
additional eight years, by concluding that Rule 60(b)(1) did not provide Bybee a basis 
for relief from the Order even though the trial court had erred, as a matter of law, in 
entering the Order. (R. at 168). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is 
ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
Melyin, 2 P.3d 451, 454 (Utah App. 2000). However, the trial court's determination that 
Rule 60(b)(1) did not provide Bybee the proper procedure for setting aside the order 
depends upon the trial court's legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1993). 
2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Bybee's motion to 
set aside the February 8th Ex Parte Order, purporting to extend the judgment against 
Bybee for an additional eight years, by concluding that Rule 60(b) did not provide Bybee 
a basis for relief from the Order even though the Order was entered without due 
process of law to Bybee. (R. at 109). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is 
ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
Melyin, 2 P.3d 451, 454 (Utah App. 2000). However, the trial court's determination that 
Rule 60(b) did not provide Bybee the proper procedure for setting aside the order 
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depends upon the trial court's legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1993). 
COURT RULE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a dispute over whether the validity and enforceability of a 
district court judgment can be extended beyond eight years for an additional eight years 
simply by the judgment creditors filing a motion with the district court. The judgment 
debtor filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside 
the orders purporting to extend the life of the judgment. This an appeal from a final 
order of the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, denying 
the judgment debtor's motion to set aside the orders. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts. 
In this appeal, the only facts relevant to the procedural issue presented on 
appeal involve the course of the proceedings before the Trial Court. Accordingly, the 
"Course of Proceedings" and the "Statement of Facts" are herein combined. 
On May 10,1993, a Default Judgment was entered against Bybee and against 
Summerhawk, Inc., dba Citioil. (R. at 71). The case remained mostly dormant after that 
time. (See the absence of activity in the Record.) 
Nearly eight years later, on February 8, 2001, the Fishers filed an Ex-Parte 
Motion to Extend Judgment, seeking to have the trial court enter an order "extending the 
time to pursue collection of the judgment obtained against defendants on May 10, 
1993." (R. at 85). In addition to the motion, the Fishers filed a brief supporting 
memorandum and an affidavit, stating simply that several attempts had been made to 
collect the judgment, but that it remained unsatisfied, and the judgment should thus be 
renewed and the time to collect extended. (R. at 87, 90). 
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An Order prepared by the Fishers was signed by Judge Harding, Jr. that same 
day, February 8, 2001, granting the Fishers' motion and purporting to extend the 
judgment against Bybee an additional eight years. (R. at 92). 
However, no copies of the ex parte motion or the memorandum signed and filed 
with trial court on February 8, 2001, were ever mailed to Bybee, and copies of the 
affidavit and the proposed order were not mailed to Bybee until several days after the 
entry of the order, along with post-dated copies of the ex parte motion and 
memorandum. (R. at 113,155, 161). 
On February 9, 2001, the case was reassigned from Judge Harding, Jr. to Judge 
Schofield. (R. at 112). 
On or about March 26, 2001, the Fishers filed virtually the same motion, 
memorandum and affidavit with the trial court. (R. at 94, 96, 99). This time, however, 
the documents were mailed to Bybee's last known address on or about March 23, 2001. 
(R. at 93, 95). 
Bybee chose not to respond, believing that the trial court would not enter an 
order granting the procedurally improper motion. Moreover, Bybee never received a 
copy of a proposed order or a notice to submit for decision. (R. at 112). 
Unbeknownst to Bybee, Judge Harding, Jr., not Judge Schofield, entered another 
order on April 17, 2001, again purporting to extend the judgment against Bybee for 
another eight years. (R. at 100-101). 
Bybee was never given any notice by the Fishers or by the trial court that either 
the February 8th or the April 17th orders had been entered or that any of Fishers' 
motions had been granted. (R. at 112). Moreover, all the documents Bybee received 
from the Fishers in this case showed a case number of 920400636, which apparently 
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was at one time a valid case number for these parties. (R. at 131, 133, 135,147, 151, 
153, 155). Nevertheless, none of the Fishers' motions were filed by the trial court under 
that case number, and a search of court records under that number did not reveal the 
filings or any orders of the trial court. (R. at 111 -112). 
Instead, the trial court chose to file the motions under case number 920003313, 
and both of the orders were entered under that case number. (See Case Number 
associated with the Record.) 
Bybee, through counsel, later discovered that such orders had been entered by 
the trial court. Bybee then filed a motion with the trial court on July 16, 2001, to set 
aside those orders in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
claiming that the February 8th Order was entered in violation of Bybee's due process 
rights and that the trial court committed a mistake of law by granting a motion to extend 
the judgment. (R. at 106, 114). The Fishers opposed the motion. (R. at 162). 
Following a hearing on February 28, 2002 (R. at 174, 200), the trial court issued 
a Ruling, holding that the motions to extend the judgment against Bybee were 
erroneously granted, but also concluding that Bybee could not challenge the orders 
extending the judgment by a Rule 60(b) motion. (R. at 182). Accordingly, the trial court 
denied Bybee's Motion to Set Aside Orders Extending Judgment. An Order to that 
effect was entered on April 9, 2002. (R. at 184). 
This appeal ensued, with Bybee filing a Notice of Appeal on May 8, 2002. (R. at 
187). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that Rule 60(b) was not available to Bybee to 
remedy the Trial Court's legal error in extending the Fishers' judgment by motion rather 
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than by the filing of a new action. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion 
when it denied Bybee's motion to set aside the April 17th Order. The majority have 
Utah cases addressing the subject have established that misapplication of the 
law by a trial court can form the basis for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Moreover, the 
plain language of Rule 60(b)(1) supports the understanding that a "mistake" 
includes errors in judicial application of the law. In addition, allowing a motion 
brought under Rule 60(b)(1) to be used to correct judicial error is also consistent 
with the policy of giving trial courts the opportunity to correct their own errors 
prior to appeal. Interpreting Rule 60(b)(1) in any other way would effectively 
deprive Bybee of the ability to present his claim to the trial court prior to appeal. 
In addition, the Franklin Covey case relied upon by the Trial Court is 
readily distinguishable from the present matter. For one, Bybee's motion did not 
follow the entry of a judgment. Thus, a motion for new trial was not available to 
Bybee in this case as it was in Franklin Covey. Moreover, the Trial Court's error 
in this case likely did not arise from a misunderstanding of the law as in Franklin 
Covey, but was more likely the inadvertent entry of an order granting a seemingly 
unopposed motion. The law requiring a judgment to be renewed by filing a new 
complaint is well-established in Utah. Finally, unlike the circumstances in 
Franklin Covey, the facts of this case make it unlikely that an appeal could have 
been filed in this case within 30 days of entry of the Court's April 17 Order. 
In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by denying Bybee's motion to set 
aside the February 8 Ex Parte Order, purporting to extend the judgment against Bybee 
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for an additional eight years, by concluding that Rule 60(b) did not provide Bybee a 
basis for relief from the Order even though the Order was entered without due process 
of law to Bybee. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reverse the Trial Court's Order 
denying Bybee's motion to set aside the February 8th and April 17th Orders, 
purporting to extend the life of the Fishers' judgment, and should vacate those 
Orders. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
Bybee's Motion to Set Aside the April 17th Order on the Basis that 
Rule 60(b)(1) Could Not Be Used to Correct a Mistake of Law. 
In its Ruling dated March 5, 2002, the Trial Court concluded that "the use of a 
motion to extend a judgment is improper." (R. at 180). Indeed, the Trial Court 
determined that "the appropriate method to extend a judgment was by a new action, a 
new complaint." (R. at 177). 
Nevertheless, the Trial Court also concluded that Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure did not provide Bybee a procedural basis for redressing the Trial 
Court's mistake of law in extending the judgment because the time to appeal from the 
April 17th Order had already expired when Bybee made his motion on July 16, 2001. 
The Trial Court erred in concluding that Rule 60(b) was not available to Bybee to 
remedy the Trial Court's legal error in extending the Fishers' judgment by motion rather 
than by the filing of a new action. Accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion 
when it denied Bybee's motion to set aside the April 17th Order. A trial court's ruling on 
a Rule 60(b) motion is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey 
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Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 2000 UT App 110, If 8. However, the Trial 
Court's determination that Rule 60(b)(1) did not provide Bybee the proper procedure for 
setting aside the order is based upon a legal conclusion, which should be reviewed by 
this Court for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1993). 
A. Utah case law has established that misapplication of the law by a 
trial court can form the basis for a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. 
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that "[o]n 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons:... mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Moreover, Utah Courts have long recognized that "a judicial error or 
'mistake of law by the trial court may support a Rule 60(b) motion.'" Bischel v. 
Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995); see also Otteson v. State, 945 P.2d 170, 
172 (Utah App. 1997) ("The Rule 60(b) motion alleged a mistake of law; accordingly, it 
came within rule 60(b)(1) "); Udv v. Udv, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1995) 
(holding that "a mistake of law by the trial court may support a Rule 60(b) motion"). 
In the Udv case, the former husband appealed the denial of his Rule 
60(b)(1) motion, arguing that "the trial court committed judicial error when it failed 
to base its child support determination upon a joint custody worksheet" as 
required by statute. Udy 893 P.2d at 1099. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed 
with the appellant's assertion "that 'mistake' under Rule 60(b)(1) includes judicial 
er ror . . . [or] a mistake of law by the trial court." ] d 
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In the Bischel case, the appellant filed a Rule 60(b) motion challenging "the 
trial court's definition of 'strict compliance' required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act." Bischel, 907 P.2d at 277 & n.2. Although the appellant had 
styled her motion as a Rule 60(b)(7) motion, the Utah Court of Appeals 
determined that the motion was really a Rule 60(b)(1) motion based upon alleged 
mistake and that the appellant had filed her motion within the requisite three-
month time period, j d at n.2. The appellate court then concluded that "a 
mistake of law existed; therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied Bischel's Rule 60(b) motion." Id, at 277. 
Finally, in the Otteson case, the Otteson claimed that the motion to dismiss 
her claims should not have been granted in light of the court's prior holding in the 
Baker v. Angus case. Otteson, 945 P.2d at 172 (citing Baker, 910 P.2d 427 
(Utah App. 1996)). Nevertheless, Otteson attempted to bring her motion under 
Rule 60(b)(7). ]d. Again, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that because the 
motion alleged a mistake of law, "it came within Rule 60(b)(1) and must have 
been brought within three months of entry of the judgment." ] d (affirming the trial 
court's denial of the motion because Otteson's motion was not filed within the 
three-month period). 
Similarly, several federal courts have held that "[t]he 'mistakes' of judges 
may be remedied under" Rule 60(b)(1), which "rule encompasses mistakes in the 
application of the law." Parks v. U.S. Life & Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838, 839-40 
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(11tnCir. 1982); see also Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., 608 F.2d 96, 104 (4tn 
Cir. 1979); Oliver v. Home Indemnity Co.. 470 F.2d 329, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Nevertheless, the Trial Court in our case became confused with what it 
perceived as conflicting opinions from the Court of Appeals in light of that court's 
decision in Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin. 2 P.3d 451, 2000 UT App 
110. In its Ruling, the Trial Court even queried: "When confronted with this 
diametrically opposite case law, what is a trial court to do?" (R. at 181). 
The fact remains that the majority of Utah courts addressing the issue 
have concluded that Rule 60(b)(1) can support a motion seeking to remedy a trial 
court's misapplication or misunderstanding of the law. Moreover, the majority's 
interpretation of Rule 60(b)(1) is more consistent with the rule's plain language 
than the interpretation urged by the Franklin Covey court. 
B. The plain language of Rule 60(b)(1) supports the understanding 
that a "mistake" includes errors in judicial application of the law. 
In any event, Utah courts will interpret their rules by first examining the 
plain language of the court rule. See, e.g.. Dipoma v. McPhie. 29 P.3d 1225, 
2001 UT 61, If 13; Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App. 
1994). 
The plain language of Rule 60(b)(1) unambiguously provides that a party 
may be relieved from the adverse effect of a judgment or order on the basis of 
"mistake". The term "mistake" is not modified or limited in any way. Accordingly, 
"mistake" should be understood, as the term is commonly defined, to include any 
"misunderstanding of the meaning or implication of something" or any "wrong 
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action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or 
inattention." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 760 (1990). Clearly, the 
term encompasses such mistakes in legal judgment committed by trial judges. 
Indeed, the Federal Rule upon which Utah's Rule 60(b) was based had 
been modified to intentionally broaden the scope of the rule. As explained by 
one court: 
Rule 60(b) does not confine the "mistake" for which vacation of a 
judgment may be had to mistake by the moving party. It is true that, 
as originally drafted, the Rule was restricted to relief from "his 
mistake," meaning that of the moving party. But with the 1946 
revision "his" was omitted from the Rule. The Advisory Committee's 
Note explains the omission was prompted by the feeling that the 
personal "pronoun 'his' has been eliminated on the basis that it is too 
restrictive, and that the subdivision should include the mistake or 
neglect of others which may be just as mater ia l . . . . 
Compton, 608 F.2d at 104. 
Accordingly, this Court should not now interpret the Rule 60(b)(1) in 
a way that unduly restricts the meaning of "mistake" in that rule. The plain 
language of the rule clearly supports the holdings of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Udv, Bischel, and Otteson. 
C. Allowing the application of Rule 60(b)(1) to Bybee's situation is 
consistent with the judicial policy of giving trial courts the opportunity to 
correct their own errors. 
Allowing a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(1) to be used to correct 
judicial error is also consistent with the policy of giving trial courts the opportunity 
to correct their own errors prior to appeal. Interpreting Rule 60(b)(1) in any other 
way would effectively deprive Bybee of the ability to present his claim to the trial 
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court prior to appeal and would thus cause Bybee to lose the right to even assert 
the issue on appeal. "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holqate, 10 P.3d 346, 2000 UT 74, U 11. 
"[I]n the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought 1o be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." ] d ; see 
also Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352,1354 (Utah 1986) ("The court must be afforded 
a timely opportunity to correct its error, or the objecting party will have waived its 
right to argue the objection on appeal. This is so [when] the error involves a 
question of law or procedure . . . ."). Obviously, such a policy will best conserve 
judicial resources and will do more to reduce the time and financial costs to the 
litigants. 
In some cases, Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
for the granting of a new trial on the basis of some "[e]rror in law." However, 
Rule 59 expressly permits a motion for "a new trial" only following "the entry of 
the judgment." Rule 59 does not provide a remedy following a trial court's ruling 
on a procedural motion to "extend" an existing judgment. Indeed, Utah courts 
have previously allowed the use of Rule 59 only in connection with a judgment, 
entered either following trial or following a grant of summary judgment. See 
Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101,1105 (Utah App. 1990). 
In keeping with the recognized judicial policy of requiring litigants to first 
present claims of mistake to the trial court before requiring (or even allowing) the 
same claims to be raised on appeal, this Court should hold that Rule 60(b)(1) is 
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available to litigants to address a judicial mistake of law, at least when Rule 59 
does not otherwise apply. 
D. The Franklin Covey case is readily distinguishable from the 
present matter. 
1. A motion for new trial was not available to Bvbee in this case as it was in 
Franklin Covey. 
Instead of relying upon the Udv, Bischel. and Otteson cases, the Trial 
Court determined that it would follow the reasoning adopted in the Franklin 
Covey case, wherein the Court of Appeals quoted the federal Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the proposition that "an appeal or motion for new trial, rather 
than a [Rule] 60(b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law." 
Franklin Covey. 2 P.3d at 456, fl 21. Accordingly, the Trial Court ruled that "[i]n a 
case where the trial court has made a mistake as to a fundamental principle of 
law and in which a final order has been issued, the appropriate forum for a 
remedy is an appellate court." (R. at) 
Nevertheless, the Franklin Covey case involved a Rule 60(b) motion made 
following the grant of a summary judgment that disposed of the merits of the 
case and eliminated the need for a trial. Franklin Covey. 2 P.3d at 454, fflj 6-7. 
Conversely, Bybee's Rule 60(b) motion was made following a ruling on a 
procedural motion to extend the life of the judgment previously entered. The 
merits of the underlying judgment are not an issue in this case, nor would a "trial" 
have been scheduled to resolve factual or legal matters. While the court in 
Franklin Covey recognized an "appeal or motion for new triaf as providing the 
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proper procedure to correct legal error by a trial court, a Rule 59 motion for a new 
trial is simply not available in this case—as has been discussed previously in this 
brief in section I.C. 
2. The Trial Court's error in this case likely did not arise from a 
misunderstanding of the law as in Franklin Covey, but rather from the inadvertent 
grant of a flawed but seemingly unopposed motion. 
The Franklin Covey court further indicated that 
"judicial error involving a fundamental misconception of the law 
should be distinguished from inadvertent judicial oversight.. . and 
that [trial] courts should be more willing to use Rule 60(b)(1) to 
correct a minor oversight.. . , which in most cases would be 
obvious, than . . . to correct a fundamental error of law, which in 
many cases would not be as clear." 
i d at 457, U 22. To the extent that the Franklin Covey court suggests that Rule 
60(b)(1) would be available to correct "clerical mistakes caused by inadvertence", 
that court is overlooking the purposes of Rule 60(a), which already allows a trial 
court to remedy clerical errors. As this Court has previously recognized, 
[a] clerical error is one made in recording a judgment that results in 
the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual 
intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one 
made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively 
incorrect judgment. 
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125,130 (Utah 1989). 
In any event, the mistake of law committed in this case should have been 
obvious to the trial court. The Fishers cited absolutely no legal authority to 
support their motion to extend the life of the judgment. In fact, the only Utah 
state court cases and statutes applicable to this situation establish that extending 
a judgment for an additional eight years can only be accomplished by 
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commencing a new action to renew the judgment. See Yerqensen v. Ford, 402 
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-22-1 (1) & 78-12-22. Indeed, 
this is what the Trial Court determined when it ruled upon Bybee's Rule 60(b) 
motion. 
Most likely, the Trial Court entered the April 17th Order merely because no 
opposition had been filed. Had the Trial Court carefully reviewed the grounds 
stated in the motion or the relief requested, it likely would have realized that the 
Fishers were asking for an order that could not be granted. In any event, no one 
is entitled to have a facially invalid motion granted simply because no opposition 
is filed. The rules or laws of this State must still authorize the trial court to grant 
whatever is requested. 
In any event, this Court should not unduly limit the plain language of Rule 
60(b)(1) to re-write the term "mistake" and change its meaning as the Franklin 
Covey court would have you do. 
3. Unlike the circumstances in Franklin Covey, the facts of this case make it 
unlikely that an appeal could have been filed in this case within 30 days of entry 
of the Court's April 17 Order. 
Finally, the primary concern of the Franklin Covey court appears to be that 
"parties should not.be allowed to escape the consequences of their failure to file 
a timely appeal by addressing questions of law to the trial court for 
reconsideration." Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d 456-57, fl 21. That concern does not 
exist to the same extent in this case. 
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Bybee had never previously presented these legal issues to the trial court. 
Thus, this case is not one in which the appellant failed to file a timely appeal and 
filed a Rule 60(b) motion in order to have the trial court reconsider issues already 
ruled upon. Bybee had no other avenue by which to seek redress. 
In addition, in this case the prevailing party is not required to give notice of 
the entry of an order under Rule 58A(d), as would be required in case of the 
entry of a "judgment". The Fishers never provided Bybee with any notice that an 
order had been submitted or entered. Admittedly, the failure to provide a Rule 
58A notice of entry of the judgment does not invalidate the judgment. However, 
Utah courts have indicated that "the failure to give the required notice is an 
important factor in determining the timeliness of [certain] post-judgment 
proceedings." Workman v. Naqle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App. 
1990). 
In fact the Fishers failed to ever send a notice to submit for decision, or 
even a copy of the proposed order, to Bybee. Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration still mandates that "[cjopies of the proposed . . . orders 
shall be served . . . before being presented to the court for signature." (Emphasis 
added.) This procedure simply did not occur in this case. In fact, had the Trial 
Court rendered its own ruling, at least a copy of the ruling would have been 
mailed to Bybee—allowing him time to appeal or take other prompt recourse. 
The Franklin Covey court also seems to suggest that had the Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion been filed within the 30-day limit for filing the notice of appeal, then the 
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motion could be considered by the trial court. Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d at 457 f^ 
21 , n.2. Nevertheless, Rule 60(b) allows a motion under subsection (1) to be 
brought within "3 months after the . . . order . . . was entered." Again, this Court 
should not amend rule 60(b) to add a new limitation period based upon the 
nature of the mistake being asserted. 
Instead, this Court should adopt the reasoning of the majority of the cases 
addressing the issue in Utah, and interpret Rule 60(b)(1) to encompass mistakes 
of law committed by a trial court. 
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Bybee's Motion to Set Aside 
the February 8th Order, Which Was Entered Without Due Process of Law. 
The February 8th Order, if it is still valid and not superseded by the entry of the 
April 17th Order, should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), which allows orders to 
be set aside for "any other reason justifying relief." Again, the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying Bybee's motion to set aside the February 8 Ex Parte Order, 
purporting to extend the judgment against Bybee for an additional eight years, by 
concluding that Rule 60(b) did not provide Bybee a basis for relief from the Order even 
though the Order was entered without due process of law to Bybee. 
The trial court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2 P.3d 451, 454 (UtahApp. 
2000). However, the trial court's determination that Rule 60(b) did not provide Bybee 
the proper procedure for setting aside the order depends upon the trial court's legal 
conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-37 
(Utah 1993). 
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The February 8 Order was entered by this Court on an ex parte motion. Indeed, 
copies of that motion and supporting memorandum, signed on February 8th, were never 
delivered to Bybee, nor did he ever receive notice that the Court had entered the ex 
parte Order. Indeed, no notice of any kind was given to Bybee until after the Order was 
entered on February 8, 2001. 
Thus, Bybee was deprived his rights to due process of law under the federal and 
state constitutions by not being given a chance to respond to the Fishers' ex parte 
motion before the order granting the motion was entered by the Court. Clearly, "the 
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard, a right which 
has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can 
choose for himself whether to contest." Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 
601-02 (Utah 1980); see also Dairy Prod. Servs/, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581, 
592-93 ffif 48-49 (Utah 2000) (indicating that the "minimum requirements" of due 
process "are adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner"). 
Bybee clearly did not have any notice or opportunity to be heard prior to the entry of the 
February 8th Order. 
Furthermore, this Court has previously recognized that a motion for relief from an 
order or judgment on the grounds that the aggrieved party was not provided due 
process of law may be brought under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(6) "even after the 
expiration of three months because relief from a judgment [or order] on account of a 
lack of due process of law is not expressly provided for by" Rule 60(b). Bish's Sheet 
Metal Co. v. Luras. 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 1961). 
Indeed, the Fishers have never denied that the February 8th ex parte order was 
entered without due process to Bybee. They merely mentioned the fact that the 
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mailings to Bybee concerning the ex parte motion were deposited in the mail on 
February 12, 2001. Even those copies were dated and signed on February 12th, not 
February 8th. In any event, it is undisputed that no notice of any kind was given to 
Bybee until after the entry of the February 8th Order. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court erred by denying Bybee's motion to set aside the 
February 8th Order. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
On the basis of the foregoing facts and legal analysis, Bybee respectfully 
requests that the Supreme Court reverse the Trial Court's Order denying Bybee's 
motion to set aside the February 8th and April 17th Orders purporting to extend 
the life of the Fishers' judgment, and Bybee further requests that the Court 
vacate those Orders. 
DATED this '60 day of December, 2002. 
7RfCHARD R. HARRINGTON 
JAMES K. HASLAM 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed by first class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, this 'yj day of December, 2002, to the following: 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Attorney at Law 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 250 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DARWIN C. FISHER, and CHERYL 
FISHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
G. EVAN BYBEE, DENNIS GAY, 
and, SUMMERHAWK, dba CITIOEL, 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 920003313 
DATED: MARCH 5, 2002 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Orders 
Extending Judgment. Having heard the arguments and reviewed the memoranda of 
counsel, I now issue this ruling granting the motion. 
Analysis & Ruling 
This motion presents two issues for determination: first, is the alleged mistake of 
law by the trial court sufficient to support a Rule 60(b) motion to remedy the mistake; and 
second, is initiating a new suit based on a prior judgment within eight years of that 
judgment the only way to avoid the running of the statute of limitations or can a party 
renew the original suit through a motion to extend the judgment? 
1 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Remedy a Mistake 
Two cases decided by the Utah Court of Appeals are particularly significant in 
determining whether Rule 60(b) can be used as a vehicle to remedy the alleged mistake in 
this case. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Udy v. Udy, 
907 P.2d 275, 277 (Utah App. 1995)), holds that a "'mistake of law by [a] trial court may 
support a Rule 60(b) motion/"1 In contrast, Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 
2 P.3d 451, 456-57 (Utah App. 2000), holds that "an appeal or motion for new trial, 
rather than a 60(b) motion, is the proper avenue to redress mistakes of law committed by 
the trial judge, as distinguished from clerical mistakes caused by inadvertence, especially 
where the 60(b) motion is filed after the time for appeal has expired." When confronted 
with this diametrically opposite case law, what is a trial court to do? 
In my view, Franklin Covey provides the answer. 
Quoting Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 
2858 (1995) (citations omitted), the court explained: 
We believe that 
"'judicial error involving a fundamental misconception of the law should 
be distinguished from inadvertent judicial oversight...,' and that [trial] 
courts should be more willing to use Rule 60(b)(1) 'to correct a minor 
oversight, such as the omission of damages, which in most cases would be 
obvious, than . . . to correct a fundamental error of law, which in many 
cases would not be as clear.'" 
1
 Similarly, Otteson v. State, 946 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah App. 1997), recognized that a Rule 
60(b) motion could be used to correct a mistake of law. 
2 
Franklin Covey, 2 P.3d at 457. 
In a case where the trial court has made a mistake as to a fundamental principle of 
law and in which a final order has been issued, the appropriate forum for a remedy is an 
appellate court.2 
Applying the rule of Franklin Covey to the present case, it is clear that the proper 
remedy for defendant when the trial court issued an order extending the judgment for an 
additional eight years was an appeal.3 Use of Rule 60(b) was inappropriate. 
Motion to Extend Judgment 
As I noted in an oral ruling from the bench, the use of a motion to extend a 
judgment is improper. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22 provides that "[a]n action may be brought within 
eight years: (1) upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any 
state or territory within the United States . . . . " This statute performs two functions. 
First, it establishes a statute of limitations for judgments. Second, and of primary 
importance in this matter, it establishes the method for preserving a judgment against the 
running of the statute of limitations. It provides that "an action may be brought" to 
2
 This circumstance is distinguished from the case where a trial judge makes an obvious 
error, such as in completing a form of judgment, which the trial court should have the first 
opportunity to remedy. Likely this analysis provides an explanation for the different results 
reached in Bischel and Franklin Covey. 
3
 Defendant may argue that the order extending the judgment for an additional eight 
years was not a final order. He would be wrong. It finally resolved, on the merits, the issue 
then before the court. Given the ruling of the court, no other relief or order was necessary. As 
such, the order was final and appealable. 
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preserve a judgment.4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3(a) provides that a civil action is commenced by 
the filing of a complaint with the court. When this rule is applied in conjunction with 
section 78-12-22, it is clear that the preservation of a judgment against the eight-year 
statute of limitations is only accomplished through the filing of a civil action-the filing of 
a complaint.5 
In a 1965 ruling the Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: 
A money judgment forms the basis for but two legal proceedings: 
(1) a suit thereon brought within eight years, wherein it forms the basis or 
chose in action for a new judgment, or (2) some form of proceeding in 
execution for collection. Rule 69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides that process to enforce a judgment shall be by writ of execution 
which may issue at any time within eight years after the entry of judgment. 
Thus, there is imposed an eight-year limitation period on the two basic 
legal proceedings on a judgment, without any indication of an intent upon 
the part of the legislature to extend the period . . . . 
Yergensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1965). Restated, Yergensen allows for but 
two legal proceedings resulting from a money judgment: a new lawsuit to reestablish the 
4
 Similarly, essentially all of the other sections of the chapter on statutes of limitations 
use the noun "action". For example, in a claim on a written contract "[a]n action may be 
brought within six years . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. For a contract claim not founded 
on a writing, "[a]n action may be brought within four years . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. 
5
 Also of interest is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-46 which provides: "The word 'action' as 
used in this chapter [which would include section 78-12-22, of interest in this case] is to be 
construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special proceeding of a civil 
nature." This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include proceedings to 
appoint administrators for tax collection purposes, a statutory creation under a prior version of 
the state tax code. The section therefore only serves to clarify that an "action" includes 
proceedings which are filed with the court in the form of a separate proceeding. A motion does 
not fit this framework. 
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claim, or a collection proceeding. Yergensen does not recognize the use of a motion 
under such circumstances. 
Plaintiffs rely on McCarthy v. Johnson, 35 F.Supp.2d 846 (D. Utah 1997), which 
held that under Utah law a judgment creditor is entitled to renew a judgment by motion in 
the original action, rather than by bringing a new, separate action. In reaching this 
conclusion, the federal district court dismissed the Supreme Court's statement on the 
issue in Yergensen. Instead it concluded that because a renewal proceeding, or an action 
to revive a prior judgment, is so closely related to the original suit, it is unnecessary to file 
a second, independent action. McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 849. 
While there is no question that a subsequent action to enforce a judgment has a 
significant relation to the original suit, that the new action is not a continuation of the 
original suit was made clear in Lund v. Donihue, 61A P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1983) (quoting 
Orton v. Adams, 444 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1968) ("The lien of a renewal judgment attaches 
only from the date of the entry of the renewal judgment, and does not relate back to the 
date of the entry of the judgment thus renewed nor extend the lien of the first 
judgment.")). 
Finally, the court in McCarthy argued from Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193 
(Utah App. 1993), and Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 2000), that 
"[a] renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment. . . ." 
Barber, 800 P.2d at 797; and as such, "it is immaterial whether we designate a renewal 
proceeding as a continuation of the original proceeding or as a collateral order." Von 
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Hake, 858 P.2d at 196. Using that language the McCarthy court concluded that a 
judgment could be renewed by motion. I find it interesting, however, that even the 
McCarthy court could find not Utah case which allowed the extension of a judgment by 
motion, but rather, cited to a long list of Utah cases where "renewal of a judgment has 
apparently proceeded by the filing of a complaint and its service on the judgment debtor." 
McCarthy, 35 F.Supp.2d at 848. While Barber and Von Hake each state that an action 
renewing a judgment is part of the original action (and thus imply that a new complaint 
may not be necessary), in each case the method followed to preserve the judgment was 
the filing of a new action. I am not persuaded that McCarthy gave appropriate attention 
to the language of the statute, where in limitations statute after limitations statute the 
express wording provides that "[a]n action may be brought... ." 
Conclusion 
In sum, I concluded, and ruled from the bench, that the appropriate method to 
extend a judgment was by a new action, a new complaint. In this case the court was 
wrong to extend the judgment by motion. Because, however, the correct remedy for 
defendant to seek correction of judicial error was an appeal from the order extending the 
judgment rather than a Rule 60(b) motion, I deny his motion to set aside orders extending 
judgment.6 
6
 I note, parenthetically, that this may not be the end of the issue. Certainly an argument 
can be made that the order extending the judgment was ultra v/r&s-outside of the authority of 
the court. As such, it may not have the intended effect and the statute of limitations provided 
by Section 78-12-22 already may have run. That, however, is a matter for another day when 
some judgment enforcement mechanism is attempted. 
6 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, plaintiffs' counsel 
is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this _5_ day of March, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
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